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Abstract:  Construction contract auctions are characterised by (1) anticipated high outliers due to 
the presence of non-competitive bids, (2) very small samples and (3) uncertainty of the 
appropriate underlying density function model of the bids.  This paper describes the simultaneous 
identification of high outliers and density function by systematically identifying and removing 
candidate (high) outliers and examining the composite goodness-of-fit of the resulting reduced 
samples with the normal and lognormal density functions.  Six different identification strategies 
are tested empirically by application, both independently and in pooled form, to several sets of 
auction data gathered from around the world.  The results indicate the normal density to be the 
most appropriate model and a multiple of the auction standard deviation to be the best 
identification strategy. 
 
Keywords: Construction, contract, auctions, non-competitive bids, outliers, goodness-of-fit, 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The overwhelming majority of contracts for construction work are let by sealed-bid auctions, in 
which the criterion for award is the lowest bid (Merna and Smith, 1990).  Increasingly, the 
participants (tenderers) of construction contract auctions, are chosen by the auctioneer (client, 
owner, principal, consultant) in advance of the auction.  This is in order to restrict those 
tendering bids to the ones favoured by the auctioneer because of their known or conjectured 
ability to perform the work satisfactorily, as well as minimising the abortive tendering costs of 
those not so favoured.  Preselection of tenderers in this way is fine when all the tenderers are 
keen to obtain the work and tender competitive bids.  However, there are a variety of reasons 
why tenderers may prefer not to bid for a particular contract.  These include full order books, 
the strength of the competition, low projected profit levels, cost of bidding and short period 
allowed for bid preparation.  Rather than abstain in such situations, invited tenderers often bid 
anyway in order to stay in favour with the auctioneer by appearing to be interested in obtaining 
the contract.  By their very nature, such bids are not intended to be competitive.  They must 
also be inexpensive to produce and, to achieve their purpose, be undetectable by the auctioneer. 
 
One means of achieving this is through what is known as ‘cover’ pricing, by which a 
competitor’s bona fide bid is used with the addition of a few percent to ensure non-
competitiveness.  Another possible means of non-competitive bidding is for tenderers to give 
detailed attention to desirable contracts only, the remaining bids being prepared in a more 
approximate manner with a risk allowance to cover unforeseen circumstances and for the less 
accurate method of estimating.  Whichever method is used, the result is likely to be a 
suboptimal competition for the auctioneer, whose ignorance of the non-competitive nature of 
the bid precludes the possibility of selecting a replacement tenderer.  It is clearly in the 
auctioneer’s interest, therefore, to be able to identify non-competitive bids for remedial action 
to be instigated. 
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None of the major international procurement agencies use formal methods for this 
identification process.  Some arbitrary criteria are used by the local agencies, the Hong Kong 
Government, for example, deem all bids greater than 25% of the lowest bid to be non-
competitive, with the guilty tenderers being rendered ineligible for future auctions. 
 
The presence of non-competitive bids is also a complicating factor in competitor analysis and 
strategic bidding, where statistical models of bids are required.  Here the task is to remove the 
non-competitive bids before modelling.  The methods used by researchers to do this have been 
inconsistent and largely arbitrary.  Some make adjustments intuitively (Pim, 1974; Southwell, 
1971) while many make no adjustment at all (eg, Friedman, 1956; Gates, 1967; Johnston, 
1978; Carr, 1982; Skitmore and Pemberton, 1994).  Of the few objective methods used Franks 
(1970) simply excludes the upper 20 percent of bids; Morrison and Stevens (1980) exclude the 
highest two bids for each auction; and Whittaker’s (1970) excludes all bids exceeding six times 
the average bid.  The most sophisticated approach to date is by McCaffer (1976) in which 
outliers are identified, in the form of unexpectedly long tails, as a result of applying the 
Anderson-Darling test for distribution shape.  
 
In short then, the analysts of the distribution of construction contract auction bids fall into two 
camps – those who prefer non-competitive bids to be included in their models and those who 
wish to exclude them from their models, by far the larger of which is the former group.  What 
is undisputed is that non-competitive bids DO regularly occur.  The cause of the differences 
between the two groups is, of course, not so much one of philosophy, but of the practical 
difficulties involved.  Non-competitive bids are, by their very nature, designed to look 
competitive (to avoid detection by the auctioneer) even though they are not.  The lack of 
objective tests to judge the performance of detection methods (data identifying which bids are 
ACTUALLY deliberately non-competitive is extremely scarce due to the associated legal and 
ethical issues involved). 
 
To overcome these difficulties, the approach taken in this paper was to start with the assumption 
that there is an unknown underlying probability distribution from which competitive bids are 
drawn and that this will be revealed once the non-competitive bids are removed.  For a single 
auction, this is simply a matter of successively removing the highest bids and applying a 
goodness-of-fit test to the remainder.  Where there are many such auctions, a more powerful 
method is to apply a single composite goodness-of-fit test to the auction set.  However, as the 
auctions are not homogeneous, this means that some strategy has to be devised for identifying 
candidate bid removals.  Here, six such strategies are examined and tested empirically by 
application, both independently and in pooled form, to several sets of auction data gathered from 
around the world.  The results indicate the normal density to be the most robust model and a 
multiple of the auction standard deviation to be the best identification strategy. 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND IDENTIFICATION OF HIGH OUTLIERS 
 
Density function 
 
The textbook description of the compilation of competitive bids is that of the summation of the 
product of unit quantity and unit cost components followed by the application of a strategic 
mark-up multiplier in the form of a percentage addition.  Researchers have sometimes treated 
the unit cost component as normally distributed (eg, Ranasinghe, 1994) but with little regard to 
the statistical nature of the unit quantities and mark-up values.  Most commonly, the total bid 
price for each tenderer has been treated as a random variable from some well-known density 
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function.  Typically, these are the uniform (eg, Cauwelaert and Heynig, 1978; Fine and 
Hackemar, 1970; Grinyer and Whittaker, 1973; Whittaker, 1970), normal (Cauwelaert and 
Heynig, 1978; McCaffer, 1976; Mitchell, 1977; Morrison and Stevens, 1980; Skitmore 1986), 
lognormal (Brown, 1966; Klein, 1976; Skitmore, 1986; Weverbergh, 1982), weibull (Oren and 
Rothkopf, 1975) or just “positively skewed” (Beeston, 1974; McCaffer and Pettitt, 1976; Park, 
1966).  Often, the assumption of iid is made for each tenderer. 
 
For construction contract auctions, the non-competitive bids are essentially contaminant 
observations as they are invariably produced by a different mechanism to that of competitive 
bids. 
 
 
Outlier identification strategies 
 
The arbitrary strategies described above reduce to special cases from four types of general 
strategies.  These, together with two others considered to be appropriate, provided the six 
strategies to be tested.  That is: (1) highest k bids, (2) highest n-m bids (where n is the number 
of bids in the auction), (3) bids higher than the average bid plus x3 times the standard deviation, 
(4) bids x4 times higher than the mean bid, (5) bids higher than x5 times the lowest bid, and (6) 
the highest x6% bids. 
 
As far as the general statistical literature is concerned, Tietjen and Moore (1972) have 
produced a table of critical values for testing the hypothesis that there are up to k high outliers 
present in a normal sample.  The test is, however, based on the assumption that k is known.  
The above general strategies were therefore used to decide the value of k for each auction and 
thence to apply Tietjen and Moore’s (T&M) method to decide whether the k values are to be 
regarded as normal distribution outliers or not. 
 
 
Goodness-of-fit tests 
 
A battery of five composite goodness-of-fit statistics were applied, comprising the skewness 
(S), kurtosis (K), Geary’s ‘a’ (G), studentised range (S-R) and Anderson-Darling’s A2 (A-D) 
statistics.  Following McCaffer and Pettitt’s  (1976) analysis of similar data, the value of the 
statistics for each auction was calculated and its frequency distribution tested against the 
known distribution for the statistic for normal samples.  This was done by counting the number 
of times the statistic fell into its probability deciles and using the chi-square test for uniformity 
of decile counts (after Skitmore, 1991).  The small sample (n<25) S and A-D statistic decile 
points were obtained from those tabulated by Skitmore and Thomas (1993) and Pettitt (1975) 
respectively.  The K, G and S-R decile points were generated by Monte Carlo simulation of 
30,000 observations for each sample size (n=3(1)25).  As is usual in goodness-of-fit tests in 
general, the term significance is used to denote that an observation is, or set of observations 
are, likely to be as assumed.  Hence, by significance is meant that the probability of the 
assumption being correct is greater than 0.05. 
 
 
Datasets 
 
Table 1 summarises the eight datasets analysed.  Each of the datasets 1-6 comprise the values of 
all the bids entered for each contract auction, standardised to the first quarter 1980 sterling 
equivalent by the relevant price indexes and exchange rate series’.  Datasets 7-8 comprise the raw, 
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unstandardised, values.  Tests were carried out on the individual and pooled datasets by means of 
specially written Fortran programs.  The result of the individual dataset producing the worst result 
(termed here as the ‘worst-case’ result) was recorded together with the results for the pooled set. 
 
 
Data 
set 
Source Type Period No of 
auctions 
Average 
no. 
bidders 
Average 
low-bid 
Average 
Std Devn 
Average 
cv 
1 Skitmore 
(1986) 
London building contracts 1981-2 51 6.24 1.58m 82k 5.52 
2 Skitmore (1986) London building contracts 1976-7 373 5.13 0.81m 47k 6.35 
3 Brown (1986) USA Govt agency 
building contracts 
1976-84 64 6.73 1.41m 122k 19.14 
4 Runeson (1987) Australian PWD contracts 1972-82 152 8.66 1.51m 103k 6.98 
5 Runeson (1987) Australian PWD specialist 
contracts 
1972-82 161 6.27 0.21m 29k 16.21 
6 Skitmore 
(1981) 
UK building contracts 1969-78 272 6.14 0.81m 48k 6.03 
7 Skitmore 
(1986) 
North England PWD 
building contracts 
1979-82 218 5.67 0.14m 11k 11.99 
8 Shaffer & 
Micheau (1971) 
USA building contracts 1965-9 50 4.70 0.91m 67k 7.30 
All 1341 6.06 0.77m 51k 9.07 
Table 1: Data sets 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Tables 2 and 3 summarise the results of the tests based on the lognormal and normal models 
respectively.  These show the cut-off values for each of the six methods, for both unadjusted (u) 
and Tietjen and Moore’s (T&M) adjustment, together with the number of outliers identified and 
removed (shown in parenthesis) for each of the five goodness-of-fit tests and recording both the 
worst case (w) results and the results of pooling the data (p).  For example, Table 2 shows the 
skewness (S) test on highest k bids removed for each auction  (method 1) to be best satisfied at 
k=3, Tietjen and Moore (T&M) adjusted, for the pooled (p) datasets – this resulting in a total of 
307 bids removed.  For both the unadjusted and T&M adjusted versions of method 1, however, no 
value of k satisfied the S test for all the individual datasets (w).  Similarly, the unadjusted version 
of method 1 produced no value of k that would satisfy the S test for the pooled datasets.  Table 2 
also shows that G(w) and S-R tests were satisfied entirely by the original data, ie., no outliers at all 
were identified.  The same S-R result also occurred for the tests based on the normal model (Table 
3). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The cut-off values shown in Table 2 and 3 are the values that produce the minimum number of 
removed bids commensurate with satisfying the goodness-of-fit test (at the conventional 5% 
level).  This is for the obvious reason that any number of bids removed above the minimum 
number cannot qualify as outliers by definition as their retention would not have caused the 
goodness-of-fit test to fail.  By similar reasoning, the relative power of the tests can be judged for 
each method, with the test that is the hardest to satisfy being the most powerful.  Thus for method 
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1 based on the lognormal model (Table 2) the S test is clearly the most powerful for the 
unadjusted (u) data, for both the pooled and worst-case results, as it is the only test to have failed 
with all values of k.  For the method 1 T&M results, all the tests on the pooled datasets are 
satisfied, in which case the test producing the largest number of outliers, ie., the S test, is the most 
powerful.  For the worst-case method 1 T&M results, the S, K and A-D tests all fail at all values 
of k and are therefore indistinguishable in terms of power.  On this basis, then, it is possible to 
summarise the results of the relatively most powerful (RMP) tests.  These are shown in Table 4.  
Here, the first point of interest is that none of the six methods can produce a cut-off value, in 
either unadjusted or T&M adjusted form, to satisfy the RMP lognormal tests for all the individual 
datasets.  That some of the pooled data lognormal RMP tests are satisfied suggests that there is 
some degree of heterogeneity between the datasets, which suggests that pooling is not likely to be 
appropriate with these data.  The results of the normal RMP tests, however, are somewhat 
different in that all the T&M adjusted results fail.  Thus, a process of elimination leaves us left 
with the unadjusted normal RMP tests.  The successful of these are methods 2-6 for the pooled 
datasets and method 2,3 5 and 6 for the worst-case results.  Now we are in a position to decide 
which is the best method for that will be the one that produces the least number of outliers as the 
method producing the least number of outliers is clearly the most efficient in their detection.  For 
both the pooled dataset and worst-case results, this is method 3, with 419 and 558 outliers 
respectively.  Referring to Table 3, the cut-off values for these results are x3=1.58 and 1.47 for the 
S and G test respectively. 
Method  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
p - - S(146) A-D(329) A-D(782) - 
u 
w
 
- - - - - - 
p S(307) - S(244) - S(225) S(335) lo
gn
or
m
al
 
T&
M
 
w
 
- - - - - - 
p - A-D(4184) S(419) S(486) A-D(1097) S(1288) 
u 
w
 
- S(2069) G(558) - G(2204) S(3946) 
p - - - - - - n
or
m
al
 
T&
M
 
w
 
- - - - - - 
Table 4: Summary of relatively most powerful tests 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of the analysis and identification of construction contract auction outliers is 
essentially to provide better, or at least alternative, models for the identification of non-
competitive bids and bidders.  This is to possibly minimise their frequency, improve auctioneers 
and tenderers analysis and prediction of competitive behaviour, and analysis and prediction of 
changing distribution parameters1.  Once identified, the aim is therefore to omit the outliers and 
treat the reduced sample either as a new or censored sample. 
 
The nature of construction contract auctions is such that high outliers are anticipated on most 
occasions and their identification and accommodation is of both theoretical and practical interest.  
The absence of any theory that predicts the true underlying density function precludes any simple 
treatment – the type of function being an empirical issue in its own right.  In addition, that there 
are small sample sizes involved means the analysis has to be concerned with behaviour of 
multiple, rather than single, samples.  The approach adopted, therefore, was to attempt to 
simultaneously identify outliers and function type by first removing candidate (high) outliers and 
then examining the goodness-of-fit of the resulting reduced samples.  Furthermore, with multiple 
small size auctions, it is necessary for the proposition of candidate outliers to be made strategically 
by formulae, as visual inspection of many auctions is literally impossible.  Four of these strategies 
were found in the domain literature, with two obvious extra alternatives added. 
 
Applying a battery of tests to eight sets of construction contract auction data gathered from around 
the world, results were obtained for both lognormal and normal distributions, unadjusted and 
T&M adjusted, and pooled and unpooled data.  The relatively most powerful tests were then 
identified, which led to the rejection of the lognormal model and acceptance of the normal model 
with method 3 being the most efficient outlier identification method with cut-off values of x3=1.58 
and 1.47 for the pooled and worst-case results respectively.  In order words, construction contract 
auctioneers are advised to treat bids over 1.47 times the standard deviation above the mean value 
of the bids as being non-competitive. 
 
Whilst there is universal acceptance that construction contract auction data is positively skewed, 
there is equal acceptance of the regular occurrence of non-competitive bids in the form of high 
outliers.  Nowhere has it been suggested that, once the high outliers are removed, the remaining 
data will continue to be skewed in this way.  The results of the empirical analyses described here 
supports the view that the distributions are intrinsically normal, with the addition of non-
competitive bids in the form of high outliers being responsible for the subsequent positively 
skewed appearance.  This being the case, it is easy enough to construct a theoretical supporting 
argument on the grounds that, as none of the bidders can be sure of the market price of the 
contract under auction, the bids they enter are homogeneously genuine unbiased estimates of that 
market price and therefore, collectively, normally distributed. 
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 Method 
1 
(k) 
2 
(m) 
3 
(x3) 
4 
(x4) 
5 
(x5) 
6 
(x6) 
 
u T&M u T&M u T&M u T&M u T&M u T&M 
p - 3(307) 7(819) - 1.91(146) 0.51(244) 1.191(261) - 1.320(626) 1.128(225) - 67(335) 
S
 
w - - 7(819) - - - - - - - - - 
p 1(977) 1(103) 11(182) 10(74) 2.69(14) 2.69(14) 1.590(26) 1.590(16) 1.886(86) 1.886(21) 1(991) 1(103) 
K
 
w 4(2534) - - - 0.95(1191) - 1.080(857) - 1.155(149) - 14(1264) - 
p 1(1138) 1(115) 16(23) 11(50) 2.46(23) 2.82(9) 1.594(25) 1.570(18) 2.097(54) 1.854(27) 1(1154) 1(115) 
G
 
w 0(0) 0(0) 21(0) 21(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) 
p 0(0) 0(0) 21(0) 21(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) 
S
-
R
 
w 0(0) 0(0) 21(0) 21(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) 
p 5(3662) 1(115) 3(4184) 6(197) 2.17(65) 2.17(42) 1.166(329) 1.250(58) 1.275(782) 1.382(83) 16(1558) 1(115) 
T
e
s
t
 
A
-
D
 
w 1(1138) 1(115) 6(1298) 13(26) 2.82(9) 2.82(9) 1.014(2654) 1.286(43) 1.394(439) 1.459(65) 51(2865) 1(115) 
 
Table 2: Lognormal model 
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Method 
1 
(k) 
2 
(m) 
3 
(x3) 
4 
(x4) 
5 
(x5) 
6 
(x6) 
 
u T&M u T&M u T&M u T&M u T&M u T&M 
p - - 5(2069) - 1.58(419) - 1.127(486) - 1.244(940) - 6(1288) - 
S
 
w - - 5(2069) - 1.68(309) 0.45(346) - - 1.188(1360) - 80(3946) - 
p 1(977) 1(140) 5(2069) 7(205) 2.19(60) 2.20(47) 1.313(104) 1.321(59) 1.324(516) 1.421(99) 1(991) 1(140) 
K
 
w 1(977) - 5(2069) - 1.62(381) - 1.168(293) - 1.304(568) - 1(991) - 
p 1(1138) 1(155) 11(182) 10(95) 2.46(23) 2.46(23) 1.542(35) 1.462(31) 1.806(112) 1.641(66) 1(1154) 1(155) 
G
 
w 1(1138) 2(313) 8(819) - 1.47(558) 1.26(203) 1.138(425) 1.075(264) 1.122(2204) 1.112(346) 1(1154) 20(228) 
p 0(0) 0(0) 21(0) 20(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) 0(0) 0(0) 
S
-
R
 
w 0(0) 0(0) 21(0) 20(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) All(0) 0(0) 0(0) 
p 4(3365) 1(155) 3(4184) 5(333) 1.90(149) 1.88(106) 1.160(345) 1.189(114) 1.219(1097) 1.275(176) 5(1260) 1(155) 
T
e
s
t
 
A
-
D
 
w 3(2886) 2(313) 6(1298) 5(333) 1.59(409) 1.17(213) 1.098(752) 1.039(339) 1.301(683) 1.104(350) 7(1309) 15(200) 
 
Table 3: Normal model 
 
 
